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Abstract—The paper considers some problems of negotiations
between competitive subjects on regulated market. It is as-
sumed that two subjects (players) have to compete with each
other on the retail market and cooperate on the wholesale
market. The wholesale market is regulated. The role of the
regulator is to support players in negotiations, especially by in-
troducing recommended solutions when the negotiations were
broken off. It is considered how introducing a recommended
solutions influence the process of negotiations on the wholesale
market and a decision problem of choosing retail strategy, that
precedes the process of negotiations. A decision problems of
a regulator are also formulated. The problems are discussed
in context of competition and cooperations between operators
on the telecommunications services market.
Keywords— negotiations, regulations, market games.
1. Introduction
Competition and cooperation, these two radically different
kinds of co-existence meet at one time and one place dur-
ing a negotiation process. If both (or every of) sides are
convinced, that the best way to realize their own aims is to
cooperate with the other side, then they usually meet both
together at a negotiations table, and try to find solution
that would be better for both of them, then the solutions
accessible outside the table. Limited resources, however,
involves them into competition: each side (the most fre-
quently) wants to get the highest or the best part of the
divided “cake”. So competition is natural part of the ne-
gotiations process. However it is specific kind of competi-
tion. This competition arises only, because both parts want
or have to cooperate. So in negotiations competition is
something like a daughter of the cooperation.
In networking businesses like, e.g., telecommunications
there exist also opposite case: the players are sometimes
forced to cooperate, because they operates on the same
market (what makes them competitors) and so they have to
interconnect their networks to provide full services for their
own customers. So in such cases cooperation is a daugh-
ter of competition. However sometimes this is a daughter
by one part unwanted. The strongest part, the higher faith
that competition is a sufficient (or the best) tool for ob-
taining intended goals, and the lowest will for cooperation.
So increasing the power outside the negotiations table in-
creases also the power at the negotiations table, and at the
extreme case the powerful player does not want to negoti-
ate at all. Paradoxically this can also eliminate competition,
because without interconnection weaker player cannot op-
erates profitably. This is the reason, why in some cases it
is impossible to transform a monopolistic market into com-
petitive market (or safe from the opposite process), without
active support by the third party.
On the telecommunications services market the role of such
third party plays national regulator authority (regulator).
On of the main instruments for supporting competition,
which can be used by the regulator, is the possibility of
forcing the strongest side to negotiate, and if the negoti-
ations were broken off, possibility of introduction recom-
mended solutions for forced cooperation.
The paper considers some problems of negotiations be-
tween competitive operators on regulated market. It is as-
sumed that two players – A and B have to compete with
each other on the retail market (in relation to the end cus-
tomers) and cooperate on the wholesale market (intercon-
nection). The wholesale market is regulated. The role of
the regulator is to support players in negotiations, especially
by introducing recommended solutions if the negotiations
were broken off.
It is considered how introducing a recommended solutions
influence the process of negotiations on the wholesale mar-
ket and a decision problem of choosing retail strategy, that
precedes the process of negotiations. A decision problems
of a regulator are also formulated.
2. Definition of the negotiation power
The negotiation (bargaining) power can be defined into two
ways:
– as a positive power, that enables the player to obtain
a good outcome for himself;
– as a negative (antagonistic) power, that enables the
player to deteriorate the outcome of the other player.
Let’s denote the positive power of – respectively, player A
and B – by αAp and αBp . The negative powers will be denote
by αAn and α
B
n . The highest negative power of the player
(e.g., A) the lowest positive power of the other player (B)
and vice versa. Assuming that the bargaining powers sums
up to one we have:
αAp = 1−αBn , (1)
αBp = 1−αAn . (2)
We assume that the negotiation power (positive and so
negative) comes from the best alternative to a negotiated
agreement (BATNA) [4, 11, 14] – a solution, that the
player can obtain if the negotiations were broken of. So
braking the negotiations is one of the possible solutions
of the negotiation process. However this solution is not
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a unique one, because outside the table players can play as
positively so negatively. Hence a situation of breaking the
negotiations can be described by for different strategies of
playing outside the table:
hpp – both players play in a positive way;
hnn – both players play in a negative way;
hpn – player A plays positively, player B plays negatively;
hnp – player A plays negatively, player B plays positively.
We assume that if the player played in positive way then
(independently of the way of playing by the other player)
he/she would get higher value of the payoff function than
if he/she played negatively. We also assume that he/she
would get higher value of the payoff function if the other
player played positively than if he/she played negatively.
Hence we get:
V A(hpp)≥V A(hpn) ≥V A(hnp) ≥V A(hnn), (3)
V B(hpp)≥V B(hnp) ≥V B(hpn) ≥V B(hnn). (4)
Which strategy, and so which value of the payoff function
defines BATNA of the players? BATNA is the best alterna-
tive so it should reflects the positive playing by the player.
But it also must be attainable (independently of the way
of playing by the other player). So V (hpp) cannot define
BATNA of the players because it is not attainable if one of
the players played in a negative way. So the answer is hpn
for player A and hnp for player B. These strategies leads to
the highest payoffs from these that players can be sure to
obtain.
Using the concept of BATNA we can define the negotiation
powers of the players as follows:
αAp = 1−αBn =
V A(hpn)−V Amin
V Amax−V Amin
, (5)
αBp = 1−αAn =
V B(hnp)−V Bmin
V Bmax−V Bmin
, (6)
where:
V Amax = max
l
V A(hl), (7)
V Bmax = max
l
V B(hl), (8)
V Amin = min
l
V A(hl), (9)
V Bmin = min
l
V B(hl). (10)
For numerical reasons it can be sometimes useful to make
small modification:
αAε p = 1−αBεn =
max
{
V A(hpn)−V Amin,ε
}
max
{
V Amax−V Amin,ε
} , (11)
αBε p = 1−αAεn =
max
{
V B(hnp)−V Bmin,ε
}
max
{
V Bmax−V Bmin,ε
} , (12)
where ε is a small value.
As we see from Eqs. (1) and (2) there is no direct relation
between positive and negative negotiation power of a given
player (e.g., between αAp and α
A
n ). Also there is no direct
relation between positive negotiation power of one player
and positive negotiation power of the other player (between
αAp and α
B
p ). Similarly there is no direct relation between
negative powers of the players (between αAn and α
B
n ).
However if we compare and sum up sides of the Eqs. (1)
and (2) then we get:
αAp −α
A
n = α
B
p −α
B
n , (13)
αAp + α
A
n
2
+
αBp + α
B
n
2
= 1. (14)
Equation (14) can be expressed as
αA + αB = 1, (15)
where αA and αB can be treated as aggregated negotiation
powers of the players A and B and are:
αA =
αAp + α
A
n
2
, (16)
αB =
αBp + α
B
n
2
. (17)
3. The impact of recommended solution
on the process of negotiations
In the case of telecommunications market, the operators
must negotiate the rules of the interconnection agreements.
However in many cases there is a high difference between
negotiation powers of the players, especially when one of
the sides is an incumbent operator. New entrant of the
market has usually much smaller network, and so much
less end users connected to its network, than operating for
long time incumbent. So it is necessary for new operator
to interconnect its network to incumbent‘s network. But
it is not necessary for the incumbent. This makes that
the incumbent has very strong and new entrant very weak
BATNA in the negotiation process. This difference, without
protection by the third side, can be exploited by the stronger
player with large disadvantage of the weaker player.
For the reasons of promotion fair competition the role of
a regulator is to support new entrants in the negotiation pro-
cess. The main instrument for doing this is possibility of
recommending reference solutions for the negotiated inter-
connection agreement, and in the case of breaking off the
negotiation without any agreement, possibility of forcing
this solutions.
Now we will examine how such a recommended solution,
which we denote as h∗, influences the negotiation process.
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3.1. Disclosure the values of BATNA
Recommended by a regulator strategy h∗ defines new
BATNA of the players. In the case without a recommended
strategy h∗ BATNA of the both players is defined by two
different strategies:
hpn – defines BATNA of the player A;
hnp – defines BATNA of the player B.
Now BATNAs of both players are defined by strategy h∗.
Probably the most important thing for the process of nego-
tiation is not that h∗ defines new BATNAs, but that these
BATNAs are commonly known. BATNA defines the pos-
itive negotiations power of the players: a player does not
agree on the strategy that gives him worse outcome than
his BATNA. So players would like to have as high BATNA
as possible. But they also want the other player to think
that it is also hight if really it is not. So in many situations
players misrepresents and lie one another on the true value
of their BATNA. Recommendation of a strategy h∗ defines
new and commonly known BATNA, and so makes such
misrepresentations and lies impossible.
3.2. Integration of BATNAs
In the case without a recommended strategy h∗ player A
could be sure, that he/she could get the payoff not smaller
than V A(hpn), and the player B could be sure, that
he/she could get the payoff not smaller than V B(hnp).
But in the case of existing recommended strategy h∗,
which can be chosen by both players, player A can
be sure, that he/she could get the payoff not smaller
than V A(h∗), and player B can be sure, that he/she could get
the payoff not smaller than V B(h∗). So now the BATNAs
of both players is determined by the same strategy – h∗.
So we have something what can be called as integration of
BATNAs. In some cases this fact can be very helpful in
the negotiations process.
Example 1. Let’s consider a simple example of the ne-
gotiations between player A and B. There are two acces-
sible strategies at the negotiations table: h1 and h2, and
four strategies outside the negotiations table: hpp, hnn, hpn
and hnp. For each strategy players obtains different val-
ues of payoff function, as in Table 1, which are commonly
known. For example if during a negotiations players chose
Table 1
An example of the positive impact of the integration
of BATNAs on the negotiations process
Strategy [V A(.),V B(.)]
h1 [10,6]
h2 [6,10]
hpp [5,4]
hpn [2,1]
hnp [1,3]
hnn [0,0]
strategy h1, then player A would obtain V A(h1) = 10 and
player B would obtain V B(h1) = 6.
In the case that there is not a recommended strategy h∗
BATNA of the player A is determined by strategy hpn and
equals V A(hpn) = 2. In this case BATNA of the player B is
determined by strategy hnp and equals V A(hnp) = 3. Nego-
tiations game has two effective solutions (both obtained at
the table) for strategy h1 and h2. Player A prefers the solu-
tion for strategy h1 because than he obtains V A(h1) = 10,
but player B prefers the solution for strategy h2, cause
then he obtains V A(h2) = 10. So both players would like
to choose different strategy, and different solution. What
is important, both players have strong argumentation for
choosing prefered by them solution. Player B can argue
like this: „Strategy h2 leads to the solution, for which pro-
portion of outcomes (6/10) is nearer to the proportion of
BATNAs (2/3) then for strategy h1 (10/6), so choosing
strategy h2 is fair solution.” But the answer of player A can
be also convincing: „I do not want to play negatively out-
side the negotiations table (what is assumed in the case of
choosing strategy hnp outside the table). Why do You want
to do so? Fair solution outside the table is [5,4], when we
both play positively. So h1 leads to the solution, for which
proportion of outcomes (10/6) is the nearest to the pro-
portion of outcomes for the fair solution outside the table
(5/4), and choosing strategy h1 is really fair solution!”
Both parts have strong argumentation, and if any differ-
ent (creative and profitable) solution would not be found,
than negotiations can be broken off, and the result of the
game would be inefficient. The problem arises from existing
several different reference solutions outside the negotiations
table: BATNA of the player A, BATNA of the player B,
result for the case that both players play positively (strat-
egy hpp).
Recommendation of the strategy h∗ gives new or makes
stronger one of the before existing reference solution. In
some cases it can exclude every different references. For
example, if a regulator recommends strategy h∗ = hpp, than
there would be only one important reference point for the
negotiating party. This strategy would define new BATNAs
of the players and so, any different strategy outside the table
could not be chosen. So the player A could argue that the
proportion of the payoffs for strategy h∗ = hpp defines fair
proportion of the outcomes, and so strategy h1 is more
fair than strategy h2 at the table, and the player B has not
comparatively strong argument for choosing strategy h2.
This can make negotiations simpler and faster.
Of course, recommendation of the strategy hnp, although
also integrates BATNAs of the players, would have not
so strong impact on the improving of the negotiations.
If for example a regulator recommends strategy h∗ = hnp,
player A can still argue that he does not want to play neg-
atively outside the table, and press for regarding hpp as
a fair reference point. Obviously this situation makes ar-
gumentation of player B a little stronger. In the case that
there was not a recommended solution it was impossible to
realize simultaneously the BATNA of the players, because
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it would require to choose two different strategies at the
same time, what is impossible. So his/her argumentation
on proportion of BATNAs was somehow weak. Now, when
h∗ defines new BATNA of both players this argumentation
becomes stronger.
Obviously recommendation of the strategy hpn, due to the
corresponding values of the outcomes [2,1] would make
radically stronger argumentation of the player A. Now
proportion of (new) BATNA (2/1) and proportion of the
outcomes for positive playing (5/4) indicates on the strat-
egy h1 as a much more fair solution then h2.

Above illustrated example shows that changing the recom-
mended strategy h∗ changes the power of argumentation for
choosing different strategies at the negotiations table. In
fact changing (and before it introducing) a recommended
strategy h∗ changes the negotiations power of the players.
Now we will examine this subject with distinction on the
positive and negative negotiations powers of the players.
3.3. The impact of recommended solutions on the
negotiations power of the players
As it was sad above, recommended solution integrates
BATNA of the players, so that strategies hnp and hpn no
longer defines it, but it is determined by strategy h∗. Each
player cannot be sure that he/she can obtain the outcome
higher then determined by strategy h∗, because always the
other player can brake off the negotiations and require the
regulator to introducing strategy h∗. But from the other
side, each of them can be sure that he/she can obtain the
outcome not smaller than determined by h∗. So h∗ defined
new BATNA of both players.
This integration of BATNAs can simplify negotiations pro-
cess by reducing a reference solutions outside the negoti-
ations table for fair one at the table. However, as it was
illustrated in Example 1, this depends on which strategy
is recommended. Recommending of some strategies can
make negotiations simpler and faster, but recommending
some different can make negotiations more difficult and
slower. Now we will examine this problem, by analysing
how different recommended strategies influence the nego-
tiations power of the players, with distinction on positive
and negative power.
The reasoning is simple: the higher BATNA of the player,
the stronger his/her positive negotiations power, and the
lower negative power of the other player. So we can write
the following relations:
• If recommended solution is under BATNA of the
player A: V A(h∗) < V A(hpn) than decreases positive
negotiations power of the player A and increases neg-
ative negotiations power of the player B.
• If recommended solution is above BATNA of the
player A: V A(h∗) > V A(hpn) than increases positive
negotiations power of the player A and decreases neg-
ative negotiations power of the player B.
• If recommended solution is under BATNA of the
player B: V B(h∗) < V B(hnp) than decreases positive
negotiations power of the player B and increases neg-
ative negotiations power of the player A.
• If recommended solution is above BATNA of the
player B: V B(h∗) > V B(hnp) than increases positive
negotiations power of the player B and decreases neg-
ative negotiations power of the player A.
Conclusions from above relations are that by recommending
strategy h∗ regulator can:
• Increase positive and at the same time decrease neg-
ative negotiations power of both players. It occurs
when: V A(h∗) > V A(hpn) and V B(h∗) > V B(hnp).
• Decrease positive and at the same time increase neg-
ative negotiations power of both players. It occurs
when: V A(h∗) < V A(hpn) and V B(h∗) < V B(hnp).
• Increase positive and negative negotiations power of
player A and at the same time decrease positive and
negative negotiations power of player B. It occurs
when: V A(h∗) > V A(hpn) and V B(h∗) < V B(hnp).
• Decrease positive and negative negotiations power of
player A and at the same time increase positive and
negative negotiations power of player B. It occurs
when: V A(h∗) < V A(hpn) and V B(h∗) > V B(hnp).
As we see, depending on the values of the payoff functions
of the players for a recommended strategy h∗, the negotia-
tions power of the players can be changed in different ways.
In special cases the regulator can increase or decrease si-
multaneously positive and negative negotiations power of
a one player, or increase one and decrease the other.
In the telecommunications services market, recommended
by a regulator strategy h∗ represents necessity for intercon-
nection networks of the players on the basis defined by h∗.
As we see now, depending on the relations between V A(h∗)
and V A(hpn), and between V B(h∗) and V B(hnp) this neces-
sity may be profitable for one player or both of them or
unprofitable for the other or both of players. If h∗ were
worse1 for a player than its BATNA, then it would be bet-
ter for him not to interconnect its network. It is strongly
possible that such a situation takes place in the case of in-
cumbent operator. In many situations incumbent is not will-
ing to interconnect its network with the network of a new
entrant, because its BATNA (strategy outside the negotia-
tions table) is better than any strategy which could be ac-
cepted by the entrant during the negotiations (at the table).
At the other side we can expect that usually h∗ is better
than BATNA of a new entrant, because such operator is
willing to interconnect its network on the basis defined by
recommended strategy. So we can suppose that in most real
1A separate problem arises with an issue of the evaluation’s period:
short or long?
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situations we meet with the last two, above mentioned sit-
uations: introducing strategy h∗ increase positive and neg-
ative negotiations power of one player (new entrant) and
simultaneously decrease positive and negative negotiations
power of the other (incumbent operator).
Intuitive thought is that it could be the best situation if in-
troducing h∗ could improve BATNA of both of the players:
V A(h∗) >V A(hpn) and V B(h∗) >V B(hnp). However we can
be sure that it would be the best only if the players would
like to agree on the basis of the strategy h∗, because the
better h∗ the more then they obtain. It in fact means that
the players did not agree at the negotiations table, but one
of them require arbitration from the regulator. Such arbitra-
tion (strategy h∗) would be better for both of players then
their BATNA (their best alternative without interconnec-
tion) but it have not to be better than the best, accessible,
but probably difficult to find solution at the negotiation ta-
ble. So in some cases we can expect that the better h∗, the
more simple negotiations (the players can simply agree to
choose h∗ at the negotiations table), but at the same time
(probably), the more difficult (the less incentive) to find an
efficient solution.
From the other side, if h∗ were worse than BATNA of
both of players: V A(h∗) < V A(hpn) and V B(h∗) < V B(hnp)
interconnection on the basis of the strategy h∗ makes
a loss for both of players. In other words it would be better
for both of them to not interconnect their networks, than
interconnect on the basis of h∗. However it does not men
that recommendation of h∗ worse than BATNA of both of
players has not any sens. We should remember that new
entrant would like to agree with incumbent on the basis of
any strategy that is not worse than its BATNA, and that
probably such strategy exists. If such strategy would be
also better for incumbent than strategy h∗ can be used by
an entrant as a threat: “if you don not agree on intercon-
nection on the basis better than my BATNA I would require
arbitrations form a regulator!”
What’s more, it is also possible, that such situation can give
strong incentive for both of players to search for strategy
that would be better then BATNA of both of them, so more,
probably efficient. So we can expect that recommendation
h∗ that is worse then BATNA of both of players can make
negotiations more difficult, then in the case when h∗ were
better then BATNAs, but such situation can give more in-
centive for searching for an efficient solution. However this
theoretical conclusions requires verifications from realistic
case studies.
Obviously it is also possible, that for the case when h∗ is
worse than BATNA of both2 of players (V A(h∗) < V A(hpn)
and V B(h∗) < V B(hnp)) strategy h∗ can be used as a re-
ally antagonistic strategy. One of the players, that aims at
2It is important to notice, that if h∗ were worse than BATNA of only
one of the players, then choosing this strategy generally should not be
(though could be) an antagonistic move, because a player, that required
an intervention from a regulator may really want to obtain the highest
payoff for himself, and that was why he wanted an intervention. But in
fact it could be an antagonistic strategy h∗ would not be efficient (if both
of players could obtain more by choosing different strategy).
deteriorating the payoff of the other player can require an
arbitration, because strategy h∗ could the most deteriorate
the outcome of the other player. Probably it is the most
important reason, why it is better from a regulator point of
view to recommend h∗ that is better than BATNA of both
players, or at least which is better than BATNA of a new
entrant.
4. The impact of recommended
solutions on the retail decisions
of the players
Existing of a regulators recommended strategy h∗ as a ref-
erence solution of the negotiations on the wholesale market
influences not only the negotiations process (by integration
of BATNA, and changing the negotiations power of the
players), but also simplifies the process of making a deci-
sion on the retail market, that precedes3 the negotiations.
Retail decisions are a part of a whole game, consisted also
of wholesale decisions. Recommended strategy h∗ sim-
plifies and makes more predictable the process of nego-
tiations. Strategy h∗ defines new BATNA of the players
and so defines also an integrated reference point, that can
be used for pointing out the fair and efficient solution of
the negotiations process. This solution can be with higher
than without recommendation probability predicted. And
so a retail decision that precedes a negotiations is simpler
and the finale result of a game more predictable.
With using the concepts of negotiations we can say that
existing of a regulator’s recommended strategy h∗ simpli-
fies the process of structuring the negotiations process or
formulating of the problem [16]. By the structure of nego-
tiations we mean here the size of the „cake”, and the fair
principle of dividing it. The size of a cake can be defined in
many ways. One of the possible definitions formulates it as
an average value of all accessible and better than BATNA
values of payoff function. For example from an A point
of view to calculate the size of a cake we should sum up
the values of payoffs for such strategies hl (the strategies
accessible in negotiations) that gives the player A payoffs
V A(hl) higher than his BATNA (than V A(hpn) but also that
gives the player B payoffs V B(hl) better than his BATNA
(than V B(hnp)). So the size of a cake is calculated with
using the following relation:
∑
l,V Ai (hl)>V Ai (hpn),V Bi (hl)>V Bi (hnp)
V Ai (hl).
However, as it was said earlier, it is possible that the
player A does not know the BATNA of the player B
(the value of V Bi (hnp)), and so he can not say for which
strategy hl the relation V Bi (hl) > V Bi (hnp) is true. So during
3There is no any impact of the recommending strategy h∗ on the retail
decisions that are made after a negotiations process, because when such
decisions are made, important is only a finale solution of a negotiations
and not the way (with or without a regulation) in which this solution was
obtained.
48
Negotiations on regulated markets
calculation the average value of his outcomes, he would
have to sum up values for which only relation V Ai (hl) >
V Ai (hpn) is fulfil:
∑
l,V Ai (hl)>V
A
i (hpn)
V Ai (hl).
So, during calculation the size of a cake to much out-
comes V Ai (hl) will be used, and it decrease accuracy of
this calculation.
Recommendation of the strategy h∗ changes this situation.
BATNA of both players is defined by this strategy and their
are commonly known. So during calculation the size of
a cake (an average value of the outcomes) player A can use
the relation:
∑
l,V Ai (hl)>V Ai (h∗),V Bi (hl)>V Bi (h∗)
V Ai (hl),
what gives higher accuracy of this calculation.
Similarly, existing of the recommended strategy h∗ simpli-
fies prediction of the possible, fair principle of dividing
the cake. This principle can be defined as a proportion
of BATNAs of the players. Without h∗ BATNA of the
player B could be unknown to player A, and so unknown
was the principle of division. Existing of the recommended
strategy h∗ leads to the situation, that player A can assume
that the proportion of the finale outcomes would be mostly
near to the
V A(h∗)
V B(h∗) .
Finally a decision problem of choosing retail strategy before
negotiations can be formulated as the following optimiza-
tion problem:
aˆ = argmax
i
{
V Ai (h∗)
V Bi (h∗)
· ∑
l,V Ai (hl)>V Ai (h∗),V Bi (hl)>VBi (h∗)
V Ai (hl)
}
,
(18)
where i is the index of retail strategies ai.
5. Decision problems of a regulator
The aim of the regulator is to promote competition, and
efficiency of the whole market. So the regulator should not
provoke, or even create attractive conditions for an antago-
nistic playing. This is the main reason why h∗ worse than
BATNA of one or both players should not be referenced.
However there are three important problems:
1. It may be difficult for a regulator to get information
on the payoff functions of the players, and so diffi-
cult to determine the values of outcomes for different
strategies.
2. It may be difficult for a regulator to obtain informa-
tion on a real BATNA of the players.
3. Only wholesale market is regulated, and because of
independent decisions on the retail markets the fi-
nal result of a game even for choosing recommended
strategy h∗ can be difficult to predict.
First problem, is really a problem if a regulator would like
to support of the players in realizing their own aims. If
he does not know the payoff functions of the players he
could not efficiently support them in realizing the aims that
are described by this functions. However this problem is
smaller, if a regulator ignores this aims, and is interested
only in realizing his own aim, like a desirable market share
of both players. For realizing such aim it is not neces-
sary to know the payoff function of the players. However
it could be necessary if the players did not want to coop-
erate on the basis of h∗ but only would like to treat this
strategy as a reference point (in the sens of proportion of
BATNA) in searching different solution during the nego-
tiations. In such a case, finally chosen strategy could not
be good from a regulator’s point of view. This problem
could be partially resolved by waiting with recommending
strategy h∗ until one of the players requires an arbitration,
and than by join in the mediation process, during which
regulator could get some important information in an inter-
ested matter. Whoever such a situation can never occur. If
so, from the regulator’s point of view it would be better to
give a reference of h∗ before a starting of negotiations with
hope, that finale result will be close to it.
Obviously, if the players were sure, that a regulator would
be interesting in realizing their aims, then it would be prof-
itable for them to inform a regulator about their payoff
functions and the aims, they wish to realize.
In the case of unknown BATNA of the players, it is possi-
ble that recommended strategy h∗ can be worse than such
BATNA, and so can be treated as an antagonistic strategy.
This problem arises not only from unknown best alterna-
tive of the players, but also from unknown payoff functions
of the players. Alternatives are evaluated by the values of
payoff functions. This payoff functions give an answer on
the question why such alternative is the best. So resolving
of the problem of unknown BATNA requires first resolv-
ing of the problem of unknown payoff functions. However
there is also one more problem with unknown BATNA:
the higher BATNA, the higher positive negotiations power.
So the players want to have as strong BATNA as possible.
But the real problem results not from the fact that they
want to have strong BATNA, but from the fact that they
want to make, that the other player think that they have
it high even if they really had not. So it is very likely
that they would misrepresent in this matter – misrepresent
not only in relation to the other player but also in relation
to the regulator. So we can expect that in most realistic
situations regulators would not know the true BATNA of
the players.
The problem of unregulated retail markets arises when a de-
cisions on these markets are made after a negotiations on
the (regulated) wholesale market. In such situations rec-
ommended strategy h∗ determines not a finale result of the
whole game, but a vector of possible results (in the case
when only one player would make a retail decision after the
negotiations) or a matrix of such results (in the case when
both players would make retail decisions after the negoti-
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ations). In such cases (with assumption that the regulator
knows the payoff functions of the players) a decision prob-
lem of a regulator should be treated as a multi-objective.
Especially the regulator should aim at:
• Maximizing of V Amax(h∗) and V Bmax(h∗) for the case
of individually eﬀective playing on the retail markets.
• Maximizing of V Amin(h∗) and V Bmin(h∗) for the case
of antagonistic playing on the retail markets.
• Minimizing of the coefficients of incentive for play-
ing in an antagonistic way: ϒA(h∗) and ϒB(h∗),
ϒA(h∗) = V
Bmax(h∗)−V Bmin(h∗)
V Amax(h∗)−V Amin(h∗) , (19)
ϒB(h∗) = V
Amax(h∗)−V Amin(h∗)
V Bmax(h∗)−V Bmin(h∗) , (20)
where V Amax(h∗), V Bmax(h∗), V Amin(h∗) and V Bmin(h∗) are
the highest and the lowest value of payoffs of the players
in the proper vector or matrix.
So choosing of the strategy h∗ can be expressed as the
following multi-criteria optimization problem:
h∗ = argmax
l
{
[V Amax(hl),V Amin(hl),V Bmax(hl),
V Bmin(hl),−ϒA(hl),−ϒB(hl)]
}
. (21)
6. Summary
In many real situations, like on the telecommunications ser-
vices market, free cooperation of the players with highly
different negotiations power is impossible. However this
cooperation is often necessary for promotion fair and ef-
fective competition. That is why it is important to support
weaker player in the negotiations process, by the active ac-
tion of the third side, like, e.g., regulator of the market.
Regulators posses highly effective tool for supporting ne-
gotiations process: possibility of forcing a recommended
solution, strategy h∗ which defines new BATNAs of the
players, integrates it and makes it commonly known. By
introducing a recommended strategy a regulator can effec-
tively change the positive and negative negotiations power
of the players. By changing the strategy h∗ regulator can:
• Increase positive and at the same time decrease neg-
ative negotiations power of both players. It occurs
when: V A(h∗) > V A(hpn) and V B(h∗) > V B(hnp).
• Decrease positive and at the same time increase neg-
ative negotiations power of both players. It occurs
when: V A(h∗) < V A(hpn) and V B(h∗) < V B(hnp).
• Increase positive and negative negotiations power of
player A and at the same time decrease positive and
negative negotiations power of player B. It occurs
when: V A(h∗) > V A(hpn) and V B(h∗) < V B(hnp).
• Decrease positive and negative negotiations power of
player A and at the same time increase positive and
negative negotiations power of player B. It occurs
when: V A(h∗) < V A(hpn) and V B(h∗) > V B(hnp).
However there are three important problems:
1. It may be difficult for a regulator to get information
on the payoff functions of the players, and so diffi-
cult to determine the values of outcomes for different
strategies.
2. It may be difficult for a regulator to obtain informa-
tion on a real BATNA of the players.
3. Only wholesale market is regulated, and because of
independent decisions on the retail markets the fi-
nal result of a game even for choosing recommended
strategy h∗ can be difficult to predict.
This is why the final result of the regulation can be difficult
to predict for the regulator. For making a better decision
a regulator should get as more information as possible, and
precede the decision by multi-criteria analysis of the prob-
lem. It is important that in some cases, when the players
were sure, that a regulator would be interesting in realizing
their aims, it would be profitable for the players to inform
a regulator about their payoff functions, alternatives and the
aims, they wish to realize. So in such cases it is the chal-
lenge for a regulator to convince the players that it would
be profitable for them to pass a relevant information.
In the case of telecommunications market, existing of a rec-
ommended strategy h∗ (independently on its value) ensures
that players interconnect their networks. This statement is
confirmed by the observation of a market. From theoretical
point of view this can be true even if defined by strat-
egy h∗ new BATNA’s would be weak (in this case the
players would have strong incentive to find effective so-
lution). However for reason of possibility of using it as an
antagonistic strategy it would be better to recommend such
strategy, that defines possibly high BATNA of the players.
Existing of a reference solution on the wholesale market
simplifies also preceding the negotiations a decision prob-
lem of choosing retail strategy, by increasing the accuracy
of the formulating the structure (the size of a cake and the
fair principle of dividing it) of the following negotiations.
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